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Juan F. Tellez, University of South CarolinaThe anarchic international system is actually heavily structured: communities of states join together for common benefit;
strong states form hierarchical relationships with weak states to enforce order and achieve preferred outcomes. Breaking
from prior research, we conceptualize structures such as community and hierarchy as properties of networks of states’
interactions that can capture unobserved constraints in state behavior, constraints that may reduce conflict. We offer two
claims. One, common membership in trade communities pacifies to the extent that breaking trade ties would entail high
switching costs: thus, we expect heavy arms trade, more than most types of commercial trade, to reduce intracommunity
conflict. Two, this is driven by hierarchical communities in which strong states can use high switching costs as leverage to
constrain conflict between weaker states in the community. We find empirical support for these claims using a time-
dependent multilayer network model and a new measure of hierarchy based on network centrality.Anarchy may continue to be a useful starting pointfor explaining international politics, but a cursory ex-amination will reveal that states have made much
with it. Even in the absence of a legitimate sovereign over the
set of nation-states in the current international system, in-
terstate organization is heavily structured. Undergirding this
structure is a web of unobserved interests and constraints that
guides states’ behavior. We record echoes of this web in net-
works of interstate interactions. These networks capture more
than just dyadic behavior: they represent the complex, higher-
order interdependencies necessary to understand the behav-
ior of states (Dorff and Ward 2013). For example, explana-
tions of recent relatively stable Israeli-Egyptian relations and
volatile Israeli-Syrian relations would be incomplete if they
were to solely focus on the domestic politics of Israel, Egypt,
and Syria, or even on their pair-wise affinities, to the exclusionKyle Beardsley (kyle.beardsley@duke.edu) is a professor of political science at Duk
is a lecturer in the Department of Government at the University of Essex, Colchest
applied physical sciences at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC 2759
at Duke University. Juan F. Tellez (TELLEZJ@mailbox.sc.edu) is an assistant prof
29208.
Authors listed alphabetically, equal authorship implied. Data and supporting
available in the JOP Dataverse (https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/jop). An
/10.1086/707096.
1. Using the heuristic provided by Kahler (2009), we focus on networks as
The Journal of Politics, volume 82, number 2. Published online March 31, 2020
q 2020 by the Southern Political Science Association. All rights reserved. 0022-
This content downloaded from 035.1
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms of how these states fit within regional and global structures
of power.
Different observed networks capture different aspects of
the underlying web.1 We confine our attention to interstate
conflict behavior and two networks that we believe signal states’
underlying interests and constraints in this regard—their net-
works of arms and commercial trade. We further focus on two
properties of these networks: the communities present within
them and the degree of hierarchy within each community.
Our concept of community captures implicit group mem-
bership that is maintained over time. Intuitively, a set of com-
munities is a partition of the set of states in which the volume of
trade within each community substantially exceeds the volume
between communities. In contrast to explicit instances of group
membership, such as formal alliance blocs, the communities
that emerge endogenously from our model offer the promisee University, Durham, NC 27701. Howard Liu (haoliu.howard@gmail.com
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3. See Kinne (2012) for a related approach to measuring centrality in
the broader international system.
4. For instance, Cranmer, Desmarais, and Kirkland (2012) use expo-
nential random graph models and Warren (2010, 2016) uses stochastic
actor models to explore and explain the evolution of alliance networks
over time to provide a better understanding of international conflict. Sim-
ilarly, Kinne (2017) demonstrates that the network of defense cooperation
732 / Hierarchy and the Provision of Order Kyle Beardsley et al.of teasing out otherwise hidden patterns that might signal
power relationships outside of formal blocs, such as those be-
tween the United States and Israel or Egypt, or between Russia
and Syria, in addition to relationships between regional powers.
Using trade volume to represent ties also allows us to ex-
plore our second network measure, hierarchy, more cleanly
than one could with dichotomous ties. Hierarchy, as we de-
fine it, is a measure that captures the dispersion of trade vol-
ume within a community. Hierarchical communities contain
states with substantially unequal contributions to the trade
network, while flatter communities comprise more equal trad-
ing partners.
Our focus on community and hierarchy enables two main
contributions. The first is theoretical: we offer a novel expla-
nation of interstate conflict based on a logic of switching costs
and the interaction between community and hierarchy. We
argue that trade ties capture not just the volume of trade be-
tween states and thus magnitudes of gains from trade but also
an array of potential positive and negative inducements be-
tween the parties. Cutting a trade tie, even should a similar
source for the good in question be found, entails switching
costs for the states. The greater these switching costs, the more
constrained a state will be in its conflict behavior toward other
members of the trading community by the desire to maintain
the existing trade network. We claim that the conflict con-
straint within trading communities will be pronounced when
communities are hierarchical (so states that are less central to
the trading network will find it especially costly to cut ties with
one or a few central states that have incentives to maintain order
in the community) and when the good being traded is less fun-
gible (so that states cannot easily switch to another source of
the good). This suggests that we should see a reduction in intra-
community conflict in hierarchical arms trade communities
over and above what we would expect merely from dyadic trade
flows. Below, we elaborate on this expectation and the theory
underlying it and find support for it in the empirical analysis.
Second, we contribute new methods to the discipline for
calculating community and hierarchy in the international sys-
tem. With respect to community, we employ a time-dependent
multilayer network model that allows us to use both recent
and contemporary tie data in community detection. We take
advantage of this in constructing joint-production security
communities (JPSCs) out of arms-trade data, which betray
sufficient temporal variation so as to have hindered prior
analysis.2 With respect to hierarchy, we introduce a measure2. We use the “joint-production”modifier to be transparent about a focus
on communities based on transactional flows rather than more normative or
cultural ties. For work on security communities from more of a sociological
perspective, see esp. Adler and Barnett (1998) and Deutsch et al. (1957).
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concept in international relations. The hierarchy measure
makes use of information on the weight and direction-
ality of network ties to characterize how asymmetrically dis-
tributed the influence of states is within a given community.3
Related to the link between network centrality and social
power uncovered in earlier scholarship (Hafner-Burton and
Montgomery 2009; Lake and Wong 2009), we argue that com-
munities where few (or one) states are highly influential are
structured more hierarchically than communities where states
share equal influence. This approach can be applied to any
weighted network, and we employ it in both arms trade and
commercial trade communities. We describe the new model
and measure below.
COMMUNITY, HIERARCHY, AND CONFLICT
Networks in the international system
Our theory rests on the idea that underlying the international
system is a web of interests and constraints that guide states’
behavior. These incentives and constraints might be anything
from the pull of shared democratic norms to the rational un-
willingness to deviate from strategic optimality. Although the
web is unobservable, aspects of it can be inferred from the
networks of interstate relations it induces. Examples of such
networks are arms or commercial trade, common United Na-
tions voting behavior, intergovernmental organization mem-
bership, or conflict and cooperation.
Our focus on networks builds on recent literature that has
identified the insufficiency of purely dyadic interactions for
understanding interstate behavior (Cranmer and Desmarais
2016; Dorff and Ward 2013; Hoff and Ward 2004). The ar-
gument proffered by these and other scholars is that it is not
just the existence of a third party that affects dyadic behavior,
it is the larger network of interactions that multiple parties
engender. There are many ways to incorporate insights
from network analysis.4 We focus on two summary network
properties that are closely tied to our theory: community
and hierarchy.5agreements can explain the formation of new bilateral defense cooperation
agreements.
5. Summary statistics such as these are viable proxies for the effect of
the larger network when they capture the posited theoretical mechanism.
For instance, the degree of globalization in a trade network might be pro-
ductively captured by the density of the network.
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Our focus on network characteristics begins with one that has
been receiving increasing attention in the context of interstate
conflict: community membership. Membership in intergov-
ernmental organizations (Greenhill and Lupu 2017), trade
(Lupu and Traag 2013), United Nations voting (Pauls and
Cranmer 2017), and Kantian (Cranmer, Menninga, and Mucha
2015) communities has been shown to reduce conflict between
the states within these communities.6 We propose that the
same may be true under certain conditions for JPSCs, which
are defined on a network comprising the volume of arms
trade between states.
To determine membership, one must first derive a set of
communities present in a network. A common approach is
to identify a network partition that assigns each node in the
network—here, each state in the international system—to a
single community.7 There are many different methods in
use to determine the set of communities for a given network,
but they all share the same basic intent (Fortunato 2010;
Fortunato and Hric 2016; Porter, Onnela, and Mucha 2009).
Simply put, states that make up a particular community
should have stronger ties to other states within that same
community than they do to states outside that community.
For our JPSCs, the key idea is that states within each JPSC
engage in a much larger volume of arms trade within these
communities than between them.
How might membership in a JPSC reduce intracommu-
nity conflict? Consider first a concrete example: the complex
relationship between the United States, Egypt, and Israel. In
1979, the United States helped broker a peace treaty between
Egypt and Israel. This was the fruit of years of effort that
commenced with disengagement after the 1973 October
War, still the last war between Egypt and Israel. One of the
key carrots that the Americans offered to seal the deal took
the form of billions of dollars of annual military aid to both
countries, which subsequently has been used to purchase
American arms. Effectively, Egypt and Israel have since been
participating in the joint production of security with the
United States, which is exactly what the United States had
hoped would bolster an Egyptian-Israeli détente. Assisted by
the United States, Egypt and Israel have been investing in
military forces to secure their lands from interstate and intra-
state foes. Moreover, their military investments have improved
the security of the United States, which has complex security6. Although see the erratum for Lupu and Traag (2013) at https://github
.com/vtraag/trading-communities-replication/commit/e82b76879498d87c5c
2de21c39b13bd7eb96f8a3 regarding trade communities.
7. There are methods that assign membership probabilistically. We use
an approach that captures probabilistic membership but typically assigns a
node to a single community as detailed below.
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behavior are ill suited to capture these observed dynamics, as
are approaches that focus on formal alliance ties because the
United States does not have a formal alliance with Israel or
Egypt.
In this example, sharing the same JPSC translated into
less intracommunity conflict, but what are the mechanisms
by which common JPSC membership might do so in gen-
eral? Prior work has posited that interdependence increases
the opportunity costs for conflict (Hegre, Oneal, and Russett
2010; Lupu and Traag 2013; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2000),
the ability for states to make costly signals (Gartzke 2007;
Kinne 2013, 2014), and external vested interests in peace
(Lupu and Traag 2013). Certainly, JPSC membership might
have all the same effects. Conflict could result in the loss of
valuable arms trade, JPSCs might increase transparency due
to common use of weapons systems and available costly sig-
nals, and third parties might desire to prevent armed conflict
among common buyers and suppliers. More generally, arms
transfers indicate the extent to which, at minimum, the sup-
plier does not see the buyer as a threat and, at maximum, the
supplier finds it mutually beneficial to invest in the buyer’s
security. In this way, we might infer that states that have
strong ties to one another via arms transfers have the po-
tential to develop (or are already undertaking) robust joint
security production.
We can also draw on the alliance formation literature.
Kinne (2017) shows that states form explicit defense coop-
eration agreements as a response to a common threat, and
Kinne (2016) shows that defense cooperation agreements well
explain the flow of arms transfers. Arms trade is thus an ele-
ment of the joint production economy of security (Lake 1999),
one that underlies informal alliances, such as those between
the United States and Israel or between Russia and Syria. Re-
gardless of whether the alliance is formal or informal, the goal
of participating is the same: to pool resources and take ad-
vantage of comparative advantages in security production
(Deutsch et al. 1957; Walt 1990). This can lead to reductions
in intracommunity conflict: formal alliance commitments en-
able member states to coordinate behavior, overcome bargain-
ing problems, and reduce the potential for conflict among one
another (Bearce, Flanagan, and Floros 2006; Fang, Johnson, and
Leeds 2014; Long, Nordstrom, and Baek 2007; Mattes and Von-
nahme 2010; Pressman 2008; Weitsman 2004). JPSC member-
ship, which overlaps with formal as well as informal alliances, can
have a similar effect.88. It may be possible that strong JPSCs would lead to increases in in-
tercommunity conflict, as improved security production can threaten states
outside the community, potentially leading to a security dilemma spiral
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11. We might consider defining our JPSCs using other ties as additional
inputs into the community detection algorithm, as do Cranmer et al. (2015).
Foremost, explicit alliances and defense cooperation agreements clearly
indicate an intention for states to jointly contribute to one another’s se-
curity. Indeed, we demonstrate below that joint membership in JPSCs
based on explicit defense cooperation agreements results in similar conflict-
reducing behavior as the JPSCs based on arms transfers, which is not sur-
prising given that Kinne (2016) finds that weapons cooperation agreements
are associated with greater flows in arms transfers. (For definitions of and
data on defense cooperation agreements, see Kinne [2016, 2017].) We use
734 / Hierarchy and the Provision of Order Kyle Beardsley et al.While these arguments in favor of a pacifying within-
community effect of common JPSC membership are compel-
ling, we take a more nuanced view of the role of community
membership for two reasons. First, there are potentially coun-
tervailing effects to some arguments. For example, frequent in-
teractions within the community may themselves lead to more
occasions for dispute (Starr 2002) and relevance of relative gains
(Barbieri 1996, 2002). And the ex ante costs of conflict may
already be built into the demands of challengers and the will-
ingness of targets to concede and thus may not affect the effi-
ciency of conflict bargaining (Morrow 1999).
Second, if common membership in a community is to
matter in explaining interstate conflict, it must capture a la-
tent relationship among the states in a community beyond
that present in individual states’ dyadic relationships. With
respect to the existing literature, common community mem-
bership may proxy for common preferences (Pauls and Cran-
mer 2017), mutual opportunities that could be lost if fighting
were to arise (Lupu and Traag 2013), or synergies arising from
alliance obligations (Cranmer et al. 2012). We argue that under
certain circumstances common JPSC membership can proxy
for a latent network of constraints on states’ conflict behavior.9
Making this argument requires first specifying the incentives
of states to form and maintain the observable network connec-
tions from which communities are created.
Why might states engage in the trade of heavy weapons
with the same partners?10 The simplest answer is for sup-
pliers’ profit and buyers’ security. This ignores, however, the
degree to which the trade partners would experience switch-
ing costs were they to cut ties. Any state that wouldfind it costly
to search for a new trading partner potentially faces con-
straints on its behavior arising from the existence of the tie,
in that its trading partner may decide to use maintenance of
the tie as leverage to extract concessions. In contrast, the
trade ties of states that can both easily and cheaply transfer
ties to alternatives are far more difficult to use as leverage,
suggesting lesser constraint on these states.
We argue that the trade of heavy arms entails substantial
switching costs, particularly, although not exclusively, on the
side of buyers. Buying into weapons systems can necessitate
a further spate of supporting purchases, including services
(Kinsella 1998). Heavy arms are not interchangeable across9. In probing the meaning of the network of ties in the arms trade, we
are responding to the call of Kinsella and Montgomery (2016).
10. Our theoretical and empirical focus is on the trade of heavy weap-
ons; the argument is not likely to extend to the trade of light arms.
(Snyder 1984, 2007), although it is important to note that these processes
are jointly endogenous and thus complex to analyze (Smith 1995). We
consider this question empirically below without offering strong theoretical
expectations.
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are high—it would require major adjustments to personnel
training, maintenance procedures, and acquisition of replace-
ment parts, not to mention the replacement of expensive muni-
tions for relevant weapons systems. For these reasons, and
in part maintained by heavy offsets by the suppliers to the
buyers, the arms trade marketplace remains oligopolistic, as
five suppliers—the United States, Russia, United Kingdom,
France, and China—account for 80% of the trade (Markusen
2004; Stohl and Grillot 2009). In this vein, Thurner et al.
(2019) use random-graph network models to show that the
arms trade is dominated by a few sellers and that buyers
typically only buy from one seller. Indeed, supplier states are
often motivated to engage in arms transfers because of the
leverage gained from the dependence that buyer states de-
velop, and they worry that the growth of the number of sup-
pliers in the international market in the post–Cold War era
might threaten the political coin of arms transfers (Caverley
2017; Cornish 1996; Keller 1995). In other words, high switch-
ing costs on the part of buyers induce political leverage sellers
can use to constrain buyers’ behavior in ways favorable to
sellers, which includes reduction of destabilizing intracom-
munity conflict that would not enhance sellers’ interests.
Sellers also face switching costs; buyers do occasionally
switch suppliers or develop their own domestic production
capacity, which can constrain suppliers (Brauer 2003; Keller
1995). While we view these costs as lower, all else equal, than
those faced by buyers given the larger number of potential
buyers, any level of asset specificity (viewing the trade tie as
the asset) would also constrain the seller’s actions. So, in total,
we expect the arms trade network to capture underlying net-
works of mutual (although asymmetric) constraint.11the arms-transfer inputs in our core analyses for two reasons. First, one
might expect more of a conflict-reducing effect from alliances and defense
cooperation agreements, in that they capture explicit pledges for security
cooperation. This could leave relatively little independent role for com-
munity membership in predicting conflict reduction. In general, the ad-
vantage of using community detection on network data is to be able to
uncover more embedded relationships that arise from the notion that
community membership can be quite latent. Because arms transfers are
shaped by market competition among large multinational arms manufac-
turers that might not well be explained by explicit attempts by states to
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effect on intracommunity conflict.
It is important to note that the latent network of constraint
is present in JPSCs but not to the same extent in communities
formed from commercial trade networks. We expect, with
some exceptions, commercial trade to be more fungible than
trade in heavy arms, so that commercial trade network commu-
nities capture far less well the web of unobserved constraints
between states that we posit leads to less conflict within com-
munities. In contrast, both types of communities capture to
some extent the loss of mutual economic opportunities cutting
trade ties will bring. This dynamic suggests that arms sales
might pacify better than other types of connection between
states.
Hierarchy
Our first hypothesis specifies an all-else-equal condition, but
our specific mechanism of switching costs allows us to dig a
bit deeper into variation across JPSCs in their ability to con-
strain conflict. We focus our attention on a network measure
that we argue captures the presence of increased switching
costs within a community: the community’s level of hierarchy.
How does hierarchy relate to expectations of order within
JPSCs? Some forms of joint security production are more
hierarchical in the sense that one of the parties has more
authority to make decisions concerning the joint production
economy. Building on his earlier work, Lake (2009) develops
a relational theory of hierarchy in which states will often
confer some degree of legitimate authority on a dominant
state in return for an expectation of security and order. This
understanding of hierarchy has roots in social contract the-
ory, in which actors grant another actor authority in return
for a stream of public goods such as security.12 A crucial fea-
ture of hierarchy is that the power imbalance of the dominant
actors over the subordinate actors is legitimated by the com-
mon understanding that all actors stand to benefit from the
relationship.
Our conceptualization of hierarchy matches Lake’s in
many substantive ways. However, we diverge from Jung and12. See also Lake and Wong (2009). Mattern and Zarakol (2016) describe
a number of logics by which hierarchy might shape international relations,
and our approach focuses on a logic of trade-offs.
enhance the security of their key allies, they provide an interesting venue to
test the potential value added for considering community membership in
addition to bilateral commitments. Second, arms transfers are directional
and nonbinary and thus provide a richer ability to consider the strength of
ties and the direction of dependence, which are important components of
our definition of hierarchy, described in more detail below.
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not as distinct actors but rather as structural properties of a
network of connected states (Kahler 2009). Specifically, we
conceptualize hierarchy as a community-level network prop-
erty that captures the level of inequality of trade within each
community. This enables us to explore how hierarchy con-
ditions the relationship between community and conflict. It
also provides insight into how the implications of community
membership might vary by market context, a topic largely
overlooked in the growing literature on community.
For a concrete example of hierarchy within a community,
consider again the example of Egypt and Israel. The pattern
of behavior we identified above is indicative of more than
just the joint production of security; it also represents a hi-
erarchical relationship. Egypt and Israel are much more depen-
dent on American contributions to their security production
than the United States is on their efforts or than they are on
one another. Moreover, the United States has asymmetric
influence over the form of the joint security production, in
terms of the types of weapons systems developed and the
ability to set other parameters of foreign policy.13
We can generalize from this example to our argument us-
ing the logic of switching costs. Arms trade itself carries with
it high switching costs due to practically expensive shifts in
training, maintenance, and equipment, signaling the possi-
bility for underlying constraint. As this example illustrates,
hierarchical relationships can further raise these switching
costs, particularly for subordinate states. A hierarchy in the
trade of heavy arms implies the dominance of a key producer
(Caverley 2017). Buyers from that producer may not have any
alternative producers available for specific weapons systems to
which they have already committed. A less hierarchical arms-
trading relationship, in contrast, suggests multiple producers
and thus relatively cheaper switching costs for the buyers.
Switching arms suppliers in a hierarchical context also implies
the potential loss of other benefits of being in a shared JPSC
with a dominant power, including the provision of security,
aid, advising, and the like. The desire to avoid the loss of these
benefits increases switching costs and so further increases
constraints on states within hierarchical communities. This is
consonant with the literature: when less central states face
substantial costs for exit from a community dominated by a
central state, the central state has substantial leverage (Kahler
2009; Lake 2009). The central state, in turn, can use that le-
verage to enforce order among the community members. This
leads to our second hypothesis:13. For example, Lin (2012) argues that the United States had used con-
ventional arms transfers as a way to slow down the development of nuclear
weapons by recipients, even Israel.
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that threats to leave a security community can be credible even if quite costly,
which provide some constraints against superordinate states overstepping
their bounds. Moreover, the Trump administration’s explicit support for
736 / Hierarchy and the Provision of Order Kyle Beardsley et al.H2. All else equal, the more hierarchical is a JPSC,
the more of a constraining effect on intracommunity
conflict it will have.
Two conditions increase the likelihood that our argument
and hypothesis hold. One, subordinate states must be re-
ceiving the sorts of benefits described above from JPSC mem-
bership. Two, superordinate states must have incentive to
provide these benefits so as to reduce collective action prob-
lems in security provision (Olson and Zeckhauser 1966).
The assumption of concrete benefits for subordinate states
in hierarchical relationships is consistent with a broad litera-
ture. Scholars such as Wohlforth (1999) have argued that a
unipolar system such as that dominated by the United States
after the collapse of the Soviet Union can have widespread
security benefits for other states. Ikenberry (2009) argues that
hegemonic states can lock in an international order through
strategic restraint, whereby they set up international institu-
tions that restrain the hegemon so as to get buy in from other
states, akin to Lake’s relational theory of hierarchy built on
social contract theory. Lake and Wong (2009) similarly point
to three ways in which a central node in a network might make
its exercise of power valuable—and thus reinforcing—to other
network members: central nodes can reduce transaction costs
for cooperation by setting and enforcing standards, they can
provide dispute-resolution services to member states, and they
can contribute to the growth of the network.
Undergirding this logic is a sense that the quality of the
joint security production actually benefits from the concen-
tration of authority and resources. Keohane (1985) builds on
the logic of collective action to argue that in larger groups, a
hegemon is often needed in an environment without suffi-
cient institutions in place to sustain cooperation among the
members of a group. Otherwise, the free-rider problem is too
great. Trusting many other weaker states to come to one’s
own defense is more daunting than trusting a single strong
state. Weaker states thus may find hierarchy an efficient
means to enhance deterrence against outside threats. Further,
less central states still have some limited ability to exit—the
ties in a JPSC are less fungible, relatively speaking, but are not
unbreakable—which limits the ability of dominant states to
threaten the security of other community members (Lake and
Wong 2009).14
In sum, then, subordinate states receive both concrete secu-
rity benefits by operating within hierarchical JPSCs, as well14. For example, in the wake of Turkish frustrations with US stances on
curity issues including American support for Kurdish forces in Syria and
ccusations that the United States was complicit in the 2016 attempted coup, 15. Of course, the incentive to defend against outside aggression need
Saudi Arabia after details emerged regarding the assassination of Jamal
Khashoggi—a journalist residing in the United States—in the Saudi con-
sulate in Turkey demonstrates how superordinate states like the United States
perceive constraints in severing their security partnerships with subordinate
states because of the superordinate’s own reliance on the relationship.se
a
Turkey has begun exploring a shift away from the United States as its major
arms seller, as seen in its purchase of Russian S-400 missiles. The point here is
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ordinate states? Presumably, they are not asymmetrically help-
ing community members in their security out of altruism but
rather in return for an asymmetric ability to control the form
of community order. Such states also receive numerous ben-
efits from the maintenance of order in their communities,
including reduced uncertainty, greater gains from arms trade,
more favorable policies in subordinate states, and coordination
on systems and procedures. For example, superordinate states
can provide security assistance in the form of joint exercises—
such as those between the United States and the Republic of
Korea—which can help lock in further arms purchases that
benefit the relevant industries in the superordinate states.
Moreover, dominant states tend to have myriad vested
economic interests and thus myriad potential threats to those
interests. Contributing to the community’s security helps re-
duce threats to those interests in two ways. First, it helps de-
fend and deter against belligerents from outside of the com-
munity who may disrupt the joint production economy or
otherwise pick off weaker allies until just the strong state is
left.15 Second, dominant states especially benefit from deter-
ring hostility between members of their own community.
NATO might have primarily been intended as a check on
Soviet aggression, but it also was motivated to help prevent a
repeat of war involving Germany. A dominant state’s losses
from conflict related to investment outputs and gains from
trade are compounded when the disruptions involve multiple
close partners who also have significant ties with other close
partners. For these reasons, dominant states in more hierar-
chical communities may be more willing to contribute to joint
security production.
METHODS AND MEASURES
To investigate these two hypotheses, we first operationally
define both community and hierarchy. We then assess the
level of conflict between comembers of the same community
compared to noncomembers and whether the relationship
between comembership and conflict is conditioned by the
level of hierarchy.not translate into less conflict incidence due to the reciprocal threat of
hierarchical JPSCs to states outside the community.
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We apply a community detection algorithm using arms trans-
fers to generate time-varying estimates of the JPSCs. The
arms transfer data are reported by Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute.16
As noted above, community detection seeks to partition a
network into subgroups that interact more strongly within
themselves than outside of themselves. Clustering and par-
titioning methods have long interested network scientists
and are increasingly prominent in political science. Methods
such as spectral clustering, hierarchical clustering, and block
modeling are some of the most commonly used toolkits for
researchers (Fortunato 2010; Fortunato and Hric 2016; Por-
ter et al. 2009). One of the most widely used methods for
community detection is based on the modularity measure
introduced by Newman and Girvan (2004). The idea behind
it is to compare the links within each of a proposed set of
communities to those between these communities and find
the best partitions by optimizing community distinctions
according to the relative total weights of the edges within the
communities. Since this method provides a principled way of
discovering subgroup structure from rather complex net-
works and does not require researchers to predetermine the
number of clusters, it has attracted many applications in re-
cent political science studies including topics of roll-call vot-
ing in Congress (Waugh et al. 2009), legislation cospon-
sorship networks in Congress (Zhang et al. 2008), European
court citation networks on human rights issues (Lupu and
Voeten 2012), and community effects on interstate conflict
patterns (Cranmer et al. 2015; Lupu and Traag 2013).
While applications of community detection have success-
fully contributed to the political science literature, some limi-
tations of the original Newman-Girvan definition of modular-
ity have been revealed by recent findings (e.g., its optimization
may fail to identify smaller-scale communities; Fortunato and
Barthelemy 2007; Good, de Montjoye, and Clauset 2010).
Additionally, the Newman-Girvan definition of modularity
is not capable of dealing directly with longitudinal data; all it
can do is provide multiple snapshots of edge partitions in each
time layer, which is often not enough for empirical research
where temporal variation in data is both significant and mean-
ingful. The use of arms-trade data requires the use of a new
community detection method that can connect arms trade
across time to account for the temporal “lumpiness” of the
data. Arms transfers between close buyers and suppliers are
not consistent, as spikes of activity are followed by troughs of
inactivity after a procurement order has been met. The lull in16. The complete data set that includes all dyadic arms transfers from
the year 1960 to 1999 can be found and downloaded at https://www.sipri
.org/databases.
This content downloaded from 035.1
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transfers between pairs of states that have never traded, since
the buyer typically is still dependent on the supplier for parts
and maintenance of weapons systems, and the buyer is prone
to return to the supplier as upgrades become available. Typical
community-detection methods consider each year on its own
and so would elide this important point. We view our method
as superior for intertemporal community detection, as it does
not throw away data that arise from similarities across years
that may be substantively meaningful.
Therefore, this study adopts a multilayer modularity
method developed by Mucha et al. (2010). As an extension of
modularity methods, this multilayer model addresses the issues
of resolution limit and temporal variation of communities by
incorporating two parameters, g and q, where g represents a
spatial parameter within layers (Reichardt and Bornholdt 2006),
and q represents a temporal parameter across layers. Figure 1
visualizes the general concept of this method. Whereas Cran-
mer et al. (2015) employed multilayer modularity to treat mul-
tiplex relationships at fixed times, we directly address temporal
variation of communities.
The determination of community structure is processed
via quality functions to multilayer networks that are defined
by (i) a spatial parameter weighting different penalties to
community formation within temporal layers and (ii) a tem-
poral coupling parameter linking multiple adjacency matrices
across time. The calculation of multilayer modularity Qmultilayer














where Aijs are the weighted adjacency matrices connecting
state i and j in layer s, gs is a spatial resolution parameter,
kiskjs=2ms is the corresponding null model in layer s, Cjsr is aFigure 1. Multilayer community detection. Source: Mucha et al. (2010)77.229.176 on May 21, 2020 08:58:30 AM
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ers s and r with weight q, g is the community assignment of
vertex i or j in layer s, and Kronecker d indicators equal 1
when their two nodes are in the same community.
To calculate the modularity Qmultilayer, we started by setting
g p q p 1, ran the generalized Louvain code through thou-
sands of runs with pseudorandom vertex orders, and then
selected the maximum observed value.17 Instead of fixing an
arbitrary parameter value and a set of particular community
assignments, we scanned through a range of resolution param-
eters to explore partitions with high and low resolutions and
tested our hypotheses against each set of assignments to en-
sure robustness. Our core results discussed below are robust
to each of these resolution specifications. Figure A.1 (figs. A.1–
A.3 are available online) shows six representative partitions
using different parameter levels and the corresponding varia-
tion in community assignments across time.18 Using this al-
gorithm, the nodes (members of communities) are therefore
allowed to transition between communities, or to create new
communities based on the observed ties across years, thus
incorporating the likelihood of temporal dependence of com-
munity membership. This property is particularly useful for
the purpose of this study since arms transfers are relatively
infrequent occurrences as compared to conventional trade and
so have considerable seasonal variation. Without considering
community stickiness across time and only partitioning groups
based on yearly observations, it is very likely we would dis-17. This Matlab code can be found at http://netwiki.amath.unc.edu
/GenLouvain/GenLouvain.
18. An additional concern in using community detection methods is the
discovery of stable communities that are not sensitive to small variations in
parameter values. With two parameters to adjust, we sought stable com-
munities by first making q large enough to produce nearly constant com-
munity assignments across time. Then we generated thousands of partitions
by varying the g parameter at that fixed q to identify domains of modu-
larity optimization that yielded the most stable communities. Figure A.2a
illustrates that we were able to find a band of parameters over which com-
munity detection appears to be stable for our arms trade data, as a wider
plateau represents a more stable partition under the parameter settings. This
postprocessing partition search led us to fix g p 0:5 and 0.7. We then used
these values to generate community assignments by varying q (the temporal
coupling parameter). More details on other available postprocessing tech-
niques can be found in Weir et al. (2017). We note that we were somewhat
less able to find stable partitions (no apparent wider plateau) in our com-
mercial trade data, as fig. A.2b shows. This is not inconsistent with our
theoretical claims as to the relative fungibility of commercial trade ties, rel-
ative to arms trade ties. Using the commercial trade data and the post-
processing search, we settled on three different g values (g p 0:7, 0.9, 1.3),
which yield four, six, and eight communities on average. The q values are set
to 1 because commercial trade data do not have much temporal variation and
changing the temporal coupling parameter does not yield sufficiently dif-
ferent community partitions.
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each other regularly in every year.
Figure 2 illustrates a sample of the output of community
detection using this multilayer modularity. These are the
communities produced for 1999, the last year for which we
have data. Three representative partitions—corresponding
to high (seven communities), medium (three communities),
and low (two communities) resolution levels—are generated
by using the g value that yields the most stable partition
across time and varying the q value to reach different reso-
lution levels.19 The maps demonstrate the ability of the al-
gorithm to detect communities different from ones based on
simple definitions of regions or formal alliance blocs.
The maps reveal some consistencies across the defined
communities—for example, the US community always in-
cludes Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and the China community
always includes Pakistan, Iran, and Myanmar—but also some
inconsistencies as well. Modular approaches to community
detection typically will exhibit some variation from run to run
as some communities are better defined than others. To ac-
count for this inherent uncertainty, we ran the algorithm
100 times at each parameter setting. From these runs, we calcu-
lated the empirical probability of each dyad’s connecting two
nodes in the same community. This probabilistic approach
should be more robust than classifying comemberships with a
single iteration. For our reported regressions, we consider a
dyad to be in a shared community if more than half of these
100 iterations place them together.20
Hierarchy measure
In order to capture hierarchy within communities, we rely
on a measure of hierarchy used in the social networks lit-
erature that accounts for both the weight and directionality
of ties in the network (Mones, Vicsek, and Vicsek 2012).2119. For fig. 2, g p 0:5 and q p f1; 5; 10g. We follow Lupu and Traag
(2013) in their practice of showing low, medium, and high resolutions to
demonstrate the effect of changing parameters on the number of com-
munities detected.
20. As a robustness check, we replicated our results using the precise
probability of being in the same community. All results are robust to using
this probability instead of dichotomized community membership. We report
these analyses in the appendix.
21. While we use a measure of relational power derived from network
ties, our conception of hierarchy overlaps with other conceptions of power
based on disproportionate military capabilities. The states that are dom-
inant in hierarchical JPSCs are also likely to be the states with the greatest
amount of military capabilities. That being said, our regression models
control for the bilateral ratio of latent military capabilities, to distinguish
the effect of hierarchy from the effects of other manifestations of power
imbalance that could exist in the absence of joint community membership
and in the absence of hierarchy.
77.229.176 on May 21, 2020 08:58:30 AM
and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Figure 2. Visualizations of joint-production security communities in 1999 at different resolution levels. A, High resolution (seven communities); B, medium
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trality is often used as a measure of nodal influence in network
applications. Nodes (in our case, states) that are more central
in a network are more influential than those found in the pe-
riphery, which is consistent with the concept of social power
developed in previous work (Hafner-Burton and Montgomery
2009; Kahler 2009). A measure of hierarchy within a com-
munity should thus capture the degree of influence that each
node has within that community. A community where one
state is highly central (a “star graph”) is more hierarchical than
a community where member states share equal centrality.
Toward this end, we follow Mones et al. (2012) and adapt
the Global Reaching Centrality (GRC) as a network char-






Here, we define CR(i) as the closeness centrality score of node
i in community R.22 Since the full network of arms transfers
is a disconnected graph (i.e., not all states in the network are
connected via arms transfers), we measure closeness central-
ity using the method described in Opsahl, Agneessens, and
Skvoretz (2010) and used in Kinne (2012).23 This measure
of closeness centrality takes the inverse of the summed short-
est paths from a country to all other countries to which it is
connected, where the shortest path algorithm accounts for
both the weight of the ties (the amount of the transfers) and
the number of intermediary nodes. The node with the largest
closeness centrality score within R is defined by CmaxR , and the
total number of nodes within a community is defined by N.
Thus, GRCR measures the average distance from each
state’s centrality score to the maximum centrality score within
a given community R. Where many states within a commu-
nity transfer arms, the resulting GRC will be low; in contrast,22. There are various metrics for centrality that are appropriate in dif-
ferent contexts (Montgomery 2016). We use closeness centrality in our hi-
erarchy calculation because it assigns importance to indirect influence via
intermediaries, an important component of our conceptualization of hier-
archy. By comparison, degree centrality tends to emphasize only direct in-
fluence, while betweenness centrality assigns importance to nodes mediating
relationships, rather than nodes that influence both directly and through
mediators. As a test of robustness, we replicate the analysis using weighted
out-degree in the hierarchy measure. The results are largely consistent (ta-
ble A.10; tables A.1–A.20 are available online); further, we find the degree-
and closeness-centrality based hierarchy measures are highly correlated.
23. Closeness centrality in Opsahl et al. (2010) depends on a tuning pa-
rameter a, which weights the measure to reflect either the number of trading
partners (a values closer to 0) or the depth of trading ties (a values closer to 1).
We present results from setting a equal to 1, although we find results change
little when we lower the parameter setting (e.g., setting a to 0.5).
This content downloaded from 035.1
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munity (a star graph) the GRC will be high.24 This captures
well our theoretical definition of hierarchy in JPSCs, which
focuses on inequality in arms trade across a community. It is
also consistent with other approaches that have considered
variation in power across network structures (Hafner-Burton
and Montgomery 2009; Kahler 2009; Lake and Wong 2009).
We see variation in hierarchy in the 1999 examples de-
picted in figure 2. At each resolution, the community with the
United States is the most hierarchical, which comports well
with the perceptions of US hegemony in the postwar era.25
Other communities, including rather large communities with
China as a member, are flatter. We want to see whether var-
iation in hierarchy conditions the conflict-reducing potential of
common community membership. Table A.1 presents other
descriptive statistics pertaining to community membership
and levels of hierarchy across each of the parameter values.
Regression models
We use dyad-year data on militarized interstate disputes to
assess whether JPSC membership and the level of hierarchy
within JPSCs can help explain the propensity for armed con-
flict between states. Following Lupu and Traag (2013), who
examine the relationship between communities of commer-
cial trade and conflict, we estimate the model using logistic
regression with a set of control variables.26 We generate stan-
dard errors that are robust to clustering on the level of the
dyad. We run two models: a base model with JPSC mem-
bership but not hierarchy and an interactive model with the
low hierarchy score for the dyad interacted with common
JPSC membership. We employ logistic regression to fit with
prior literature, to enable easier uptake of our results, and be-
cause we have a clear argument for how network structure
matters. However, we also demonstrate the robustness of our
findings across a number of alternative community detection
and regression model specifications, including specifications
using temporal exponential random graph model (TERGM)
and additive and multiplicative effects network (AMEN)24. As we believe that outside options for sub- (super-) ordinate states
will tend to decrease (increase) the ability of the superordinate state to exert
constraint on subordinate states, throughout the article we consider a state’s
arms transfers to every other state in the international system, not just trans-
fers within its own community. However, results are similar if we consider
only ties within the community when defining hierarchy (table A.9).
25. See Caverley (2017) for a discussion of extensive US influence via its
arms trade. In a robustness check below, we find that the variation in hi-
erarchy is still meaningful even when the communities with the United
States are omitted. So, hierarchy is not just a proxy for connectedness to the
United States.
26. Results are substantively unchanged if we control for dyad com-
mercial trade dependence.
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(Minhas, Hoff, and Ward 2019).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Hierarchy and arms trade
Figure 3 graphically depicts regression results from the base
model, in which we consider only the role of community,
absent considerations of hierarchy. It considers only one set
of community detection parameter values we explored, but
results are similar for others.27
The coefficient estimate for the indicator variable cap-
turing whether a given dyad is within the same security com-
munity is negative, statistically significant, and, as seen through
our standardized coefficients, substantively large. Consistent
with our expectations, this suggests that being within the same
JPSC decreases the likelihood of conflict between two states,
over and above what variation the other variables in the model
are able to capture. Importantly, joint community member-
ship has a stronger pacifying effect than bilateral arms trans-
fers. Moreover, the pacifying effect related to the presence of
a formal alliance between the states is weaker than that for
joint membership in the community—which includes infor-
mal alliances and only partially overlaps with formal alliance
commitments. Accounting for community membership in the
network of arms transfers better explains the potential for
armed conflict than the simple level of bilateral arms sales
between two states and the presence of a formal alliance,
providing support for our first hypothesis.
As a robustness check, we also consider the potential for
JPSCs to be defined by explicit defense cooperation agree-
ments, as in Kinne (2017). Like the JPSCs defined by arms
transfers, we similarly find that joint membership in JPSCs
defined by defense cooperation agreements is associated with
less potential for a militarized interstate dispute, even while
controlling for the presence of a dyadic defense cooperation
agreement. Table A.3 presents the results.28
Next we turn to hierarchy and our second hypothesis. Ta-
ble 1 contains full regression results for six different commu-
nity detection parameter values.29 The table contains several
things of note. First, the coefficient on community, now repre-27. Table A.2 presents conventional regression output for six different
sets of community detection parameter values. In addition, the results
hold if we use the probability of two states being in the same community
instead of a dichotomous indicator of community membership.
28. Following the same postprocessing procedure, we used three g
values (g p 0:7, 0.9, 1) that yield four, three, and two communities. The
value of q was set high (q p 100) to capture the strong temporal de-
pendence for defense agreements, but varying q (the temporal coupling
parameter) does not yield appreciably different partition results.
29. The results are robust to using the probability of belonging to the
same community instead of a dichotomous indicator.
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sistently negative. This suggests that community on its own
may not be the driving force beyond the pacifying effects of
arms trade, since states within “flatter” security communities
are not necessarily less prone to conflict with each other than
with states outside their community.30 This also suggests that
our all-else-equal condition in our first hypothesis was per-
haps too strong: controlling for hierarchy might be necessary
to understand the role of a JPSC in constraining conflict.
Second, consistent with our expectations, the pacifying ef-
fect of arms trade is present in communities that are charac-
terized by high levels of hierarchy, and substantially so. With
other control variables at their medians, contiguous states
that are in the same community with maximum hierarchy
have a more than 50% reduced risk of conflict compared to
contiguous states that are not in the same community. Fig-
ure 4, a marginal-effects plot, visualizes the interactive effect
of community status and community hierarchy in order to
make this point. This supports our second hypothesis.31
Third, the conditioning effect of hierarchy appears con-
sistent across community detection parameter values. This
provides significant confidence in our inferences, in that thisFigure 3. Base model regression results using parameter setting q p 1,
g p 0:5.30. We ran additional analyses using some common network models.
Tables A.13–A.20 show that results are largely consistent when we use
TERGM and AMEN models.
31. While our primary goal is not prediction, we also evaluate out-of-
sample prediction using the network variables. We find that including the
network variables marginally improves predictive performance.
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32. As a test of robustness, we also replicate the analysis by aggregating
to the community level and testing whether more hierarchical communities
tend to have less conflict. The results are qualitatively similar, although some
estimates do not reach conventional significance levels given the radically
reduced sample size (table A.11).
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range of parameter values produces anywhere from two to
10 different communities in the world system. Regardless of
how finely states are grouped, the same substantive effect
holds: hierarchical arms trade communities pacify.32
Finally, note that our argument, based on the degree to which
stronger states can influence weaker ones to act in accordancewith stronger states’ desires, makes no claim on intercom-
munity conflict. Dominant states in more hierarchical com-
munities may be better able to defend community members
but such communities might be more threatening to other
communities. The results indicate that the coefficient on hi-
erarchy—the lower hierarchy score in each dyad—is signif-
icant and positive, showing greater conflict between more
hierarchical communities. This intercommunity finding cor-
roborates in some ways existing understandings of interna-
tional politics. Since more hierarchical communities better
serve the dominant actor, they may induce a greater threat to
strong external states, increasing the potential for conflictTable 1. Interstate Arms Trade: Hierarchy ModelsLow Spatial Resolution High Spatial ResolutionLow TR Medium TR High TR Low TR Medium TR High TRIntercept 26.582*** 26.778*** 26.759*** 26.488*** 26.505*** 26.267***
(.425) (.441) (.450) (.401) (.420) (.385)Same community .237 .371 .493* .214 2.203 2.361*
(.246) (.270) (.281) (.210) (.261) (.201)Hierarchy (lower) .004*** .004*** .004*** .004*** .003*** .003***
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)Arms transfer (lower) 2.019 2.019 2.019 2.019 2.020 2.021
(.017) (.017) (.017) (.017) (.017) (.017)GDP (high) .155*** .158*** .162*** .157*** .153*** .147***
(.044) (.044) (.044) (.044) (.043) (.043)GDP (low) .084** .093** .088** .080* .092** .081**
(.041) (.041) (.041) (.042) (.041) (.041)Democracy (high) .024* .025* .024* .025* .024* .022
(.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014)Democracy (low) 2.126*** 2.129*** 2.124*** 2.125*** 2.126*** 2.131***
(.022) (.022) (.022) (.023) (.022) (.023)IGO membership .006 .006 .006 .006 .005 .006
(.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005) (.005)Contiguity 2.565*** 2.595*** 2.560*** 2.549*** 2.567*** 2.566***
(.256) (.260) (.257) (.256) (.259) (.256)Distance (log) 2.184*** 2.180*** 2.183*** 2.185*** 2.186*** 2.184***
(.025) (.026) (.025) (.025) (.026) (.025)Major power .785*** .759*** .759*** .784*** .794*** .826***
(.176) (.176) (.176) (.176) (.177) (.177)Allies .049 .043 .065 .046 .047 .010
(.150) (.150) (.149) (.148) (.151) (.148)Capability ratio (log) 2.131*** 2.126*** 2.129*** 2.133*** 2.126*** 2.132***
(.043) (.043) (.043) (.043) (.042) (.042)Peace years 2.334*** 2.332*** 2.334*** 2.334*** 2.331*** 2.335***
(.029) (.029) (.029) (.030) (.030) (.029)Same community # hierarchy 2.004*** 2.004*** 2.005*** 2.004*** 2.002 2.0004
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)Note. Standard errors in parentheses. TR p temporal resolution; GDP p gross domestic product; IGO p intergovernmental organization. N p 390,914.
* p ! .1.
** p ! .05.
*** p ! .01.
against subordinate states should be rare. That being said, failure of
dominant states to keep subordinate states in line will erode the level of
legitimacy and authority that the dominant state has, and so we should
expect to observe some level of corrective measures by dominant states
among members of their security communities, as observed in the Soviet
treatment of uprisings in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968).
Volume 82 Number 2 April 2020 / 743between central actors via a security dilemma logic. And if
strong states are more likely to engage in conflict themselves,
members of the hierarchical communities they lead will more
easily be drawn into the conflict via a chain-ganging logic.
Moreover, dominant states of different communities in dis-
pute with one another have an incentive for the dispute to play
out by proxy through confrontation between their subordi-
nate states.
To further parse our results, we conducted a series of ad-
ditional exploratory analyses. In the first, we find that the in-
teractive effect of hierarchy and common-community mem-
bership only helps explain the reduction in conflict between
subordinate states in the same community and not as well
the reduction between dominant and subordinate states. Ta-
bles A.4 and A.5 decompose the common-community variable
into “flat” comembership (when both states are not the most
central state) and “imbalanced” comembership (when one of
the states is the most central). We see that the negative effect of
comembership in the presence of hierarchy is driven by the
flat comembers. The implication becomes clearer when con-
sidering the finding from the main models that the relationship
between dyadic arms-transfer volume and conflict is not sta-
tistically significant: it is not dyadic trade between flat co-
members that reduces conflict but rather the constraints on
their behavior induced by trade with the dominant state. This
provides further support for our argument regarding the
conflict-reducing potential of hierarchy. It is not merely that
dominant states limit conflict between themselves and weaker
states; rather, dominant states in hierarchical communities
reduce conflict between nondominant members of their com-
munities via the exertion of leverage enabled by high switching
costs.3333. If hierarchy is based on legitimate authority, or more generally if
JPSC structure is in equilibrium, the use of conflict by dominant states
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of hierarchy to be solely driven by relationships with the
United States. Existing scholarship has well explored US ef-
forts in the post–World War II era to promote peace in its
spheres of influence (see, e.g., Ikenberry 2009; Lake 1999,
2009). In separate analyses, shown in table A.6, we exclude
the states that are in the same community as the United States
and still find that hierarchy enhances the extent to which JPSC
comembership reduces the potential for conflict.
Overall, the results on arms trade networks confirm that
JPSC membership and hierarchy within JPSCs help explain
the occurrence of conflict in the international system. Joint-
production security community membership and the level of
hierarchy capture the underlying web of constraints. Arms
trade, by enabling relatively strong influence of central states
over noncentral states because of high switching costs, is
able to pacify within trading communities, past a sufficient
level of hierarchy. Without this level of hierarchy, there is
not the necessary source of constraint. This suggests again
the importance of the concept of switching costs, which vary
in hierarchy and enable constraint.
Hierarchy and interstate commercial trade
As further support for the centrality of a switching cost logic,
we repeat the same core analyses on commercial, rather than
arms, trade (Lupu and Traag 2013). As noted above, we ex-
pect that, on average, switching costs will be lower in commer-
cial trade, leading to less constraint and so less of a role for
commercial trade communities as pacifying agents. Further,
as the role of hierarchy in security provision does not readily
translate to commercial hierarchies, we do not expect hier-
archy to play the same role in commercial trade networks.
Figure 5 presents results from the base model regressions,
following the same procedure as above in determining inter-
state commercial trade community membership.34 We note
immediately the major difference between the effect of com-
mercial and arms trade communities: whereas we found paci-
fying effects of arms trade community membership, we find
increased propensity for conflict as a function of belonging to
the same commercial trade community. This is true across a
range of parameter values, as can be seen in table A.7.35Figure 4. Same-community effect as community hierarchy increases. Param-
eters: q p 1, g p 0:5.34. Figure 5 leaves out the coefficients on peace years and the three
splines for presentation purposes.
35. This result is consistent with the erratum to Lupu and Traag (2013)
posted at https://github.com/vtraag/trading-communities-replication.
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744 / Hierarchy and the Provision of Order Kyle Beardsley et al.We calculate community hierarchy scores based on the
dyadic trade dependence measure provided by Oneal and
Russet (1997). Table A.8 indicates that the interaction of hi-
erarchy and same community membership is not statistically
significant for any parameterization; the sign on the inter-
action is also inconsistent across parameterizations. Further,
even when we choose a parameterization that produces a neg-
ative sign on the interaction coefficient, as in the JPSC analysis,
the marginal effect of community membership is never sig-
nificantly different from zero at any level of hierarchy, as seen
in figure 6.
Thus, it appears that our expectation on the importance
of switching costs is supported: not only do the more fun-
gible commercial-trade communities fail to pacify, but we
generally observe more conflict within commercial-trade
communities. From existing theory we might expect that this
is due to the more frequent interactions within commercial-
trade communities, coupled with an inability of even central
states to impose order. This inability comes not because of
an absence of hierarchy as measured by asymmetry in com-
mercial trade but rather because of decreased switching costs,
which diminish the power of leading states to constrain. If this
conjecture were true, we would not expect to see a consistent
pacifying role of hierarchy. This is what we find. Stronger
states are simply less able to compel weaker states within their
communities when weaker states are more free to break old
ties and make new ones.This content downloaded from 035.1
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms CONCLUSION
We conceptualize hierarchy and community as two proper-
ties of network structure; together, they capture aspects of the
underlying web of interests and constraints that drive inter-
state behavior. We bring to the discipline a new use of com-
munity detection for temporal data and a new measure of
hierarchy within communities to show that common mem-
bership in JPSCs leads to a reduction in conflict between
states in the international system. In other words, arms trade,
from which we constructed our JPSCs, can pacify. This is
more true the more hierarchical are the JPSCs, and is not
explained merely by dyadic trade ties. This result also does
not arise solely from the presence of a common external
threat: more hierarchical JPSCs exhibit more, not less, conflict
between communities.
We argue that arms-trade communities have this intra-
community pacifying effect, in part, because of the presence
of switching costs. States suffer many kinds of costs from
switching their suppliers of heavy arms and suffer additional
costs when these are strong states that are the only suppliers of
specific weapons systems and that can provide other benefits
to weaker states. The existence of these costs provides leverage
to stronger states, which translates to constraints on weaker
states’ conflict behavior. We show that the same argument
fails for communities constructed from commercial trade net-
works: commercial trade, on average, is more fungible than
heavy arms trade and so produces neither strong constraints
nor pacification.
Future extensions of our approach might include multiple
inputs into the detection of the JPSCs—not only arms trans-
fers but also formal alliances, troop deployments, defense co-
operation agreements, diplomatic ties, and so on. That our
JPSCs defined only with arms transfers do not cleanly overlap
with regional orders or alliance blocs attests to the merit ofFigure 5. Base model regression for commercial trade dataFigure 6. Same-community effect as community hierarchy increases for
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Volume 82 Number 2 April 2020 / 745considering arms transfers as an indicator of joint security
production. Many other measures would miss important se-
curity cooperation among, say, the United States, Egypt, and
Israel. That said, arms transfers are an imperfect measure alone,
and it would be useful to consider additional information on
joint security production.
We also plan to expand on our theory as to how com-
munities affect conflict and cooperation. For example, a full
causal mediation model that connects JPSC membership and
hierarchy to foreign policy alignment would add to our under-
standing of the manner in which interdependent interactions
between states condition state behavior. Even more ambitious
would be the construction of a theoretical and empirical model
that allows JPSCs at different levels of hierarchy to emerge
endogenously from a network of conflict and cooperation and
to allow the JPSCs to shape the network in turn.
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